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BALANCING EXPECTATIONS OF ONLINE PRIVACY:
WHY INTERNET PROTOCOL (IP) ADDRESSES
SHOULD BE PROTECTED AS PERSONALLY
IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION
INTRODUCTION
About the time the Internet age began,' the Supreme Court upheld
the First Amendment right to distribute anonymous political cam-
paign handbills,2 lauding anonymous free speech as "a shield from the
tyranny of the majority." 3 Within two years, the Court had explicitly
applied free speech to the new landscape of cyberspace.4 The advent
of the Internet had brought hope of a new public square for anony-
mous discourse,5 a place where anyone with a computer and a phone
line could speak openly to the entire world. 6
Not two decades later, legal reality has dashed that utopian dream.
Abuses of the anonymity that the Internet once afforded have re-
quired a balancing against other private rights,7 and no longer is there
a reasonable expectation of privacy in many Internet communica-
tions.8 Instead, today's online world lulls its inhabitants into a false
1. See Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1607, 1607
n.1 (2009) (defining the Internet age from 1994 to present).
2. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (striking down an Ohio
statute banning the distribution of anonymous handbills). The importance of anonymous speech
has long been recognized, chiefly in the political context. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64
(1960) ("Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important
role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout
history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at
all.").
3. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357.
4. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
5. As one scholar wrote, "[T]he Internet promises to eliminate structural and financial barri-
ers to meaningful public discourse, thereby making public discourse more democratic and inclu-
sive, less subject to the control of powerful speakers, and, at least potentially, richer and more
nuanced." Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace,
49 DUKE L.J. 855, 894 (2000).
6. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 870; Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005) ("Anonymous
[Ilnternet speech in blogs or chat rooms in some instances can become the modern equivalent of
political pamphleteering.").
7. See Cahill v. Doe, 879 A.2d 943, 951 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005) (noting that the Internet
"presents the real danger that users might abuse the medium by rapidly spreading defamatory
information"), rev'd, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005). Nevertheless, courts typically afford "greater
weight to the value of free speech than to the dangers of its misuse." McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357.
8. Indeed, "[t]he advent of the computer means ... we have the ability to be more intrusive
than ever before." S. REP. No. 100-599, at 6 (1988). See also infra notes 325-50 and accompany-
ing text.
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sense of anonymity while secretly recording their every move for fu-
ture discovery. 9
This monitoring is made possible by the inherent structure of the
Internet, the most crucial component of which is the simply named
Internet Protocol (IP).1o Every computer connected to the Internet
receives a unique IP address that facilitates communications with
other computers." As part of the normal data exchange, these ad-
dresses are recorded, or "log[ged]," by Web servers for future network
and security analysis.12 These logs, however, can also provide a bread-
crumb trail of a user's online activity. 13 When a user views a Web site,
a computer server logs his IP address.14 When a user posts on a
blog,15 a server logs his IP address.16 When a user views a sexually
explicit photograph,17 reads a political article, or searches for "bomb
placement white house,"' 8 a server logs his IP address.
9. See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75
S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1092 (2002) (noting that the Internet "gives many individuals a false sense
of privacy"). This behind-the-scenes monitoring is arguably more dangerous than even the
feared telescreen of George Orwell's dystopian Nineteen Eighty-Four; at least there, the subjects
knew of their surveillance. See GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR, at 3 (signet Clas-
sics 1950) (1949) ("You had to live-did live, from habit that became instinct-in the assumption
that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scruti-
nized."); see also Shawn C. Helms, Translating Privacy Values with Technology, 7 B.U. J. Sci. &
TECH. L. 288, 291-92 (2001) (comparing Internet surveillance to Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon).
10. Jerry Berman & Deirdre Mulligan, Privacy in the Digital Age: Work in Progress, 23 NOVA
L. REV. 549, 554 (1999) (noting the necessity of IP addresses for network functionality).
11. United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1042 (11th Cir. 2003).
12. Id.
13. See State v. Reid, 194 A.2d 26, 33 (N.J. 2008) ("With a complete listing of IP addresses,
one can track a person's Internet usage."); Berman & Mulligan, supra note 10, at 558; Solove,
supra note 9, at 1145.
14. See Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Exploring Identity and Identification in Cyberspace, 14 NOTRE
DAME J.L. Emics & PUB. POL'Y 1085, 1093 (2000).
15. Short for weblog, a blog is a Web site to which users post comments, hyperlinks, and other
general discussion. Blog, MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dic-
tionary/Blog (last visited Jan. 14, 2011). Blogs have been at the forefront of the Web 2.0 move-
ment in which online users become active participants rather than passive consumers of online
material. See generally Tim O'Reilly, What Is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for
the Next Generation of Software, O'REILLY.COM (Sept. 30, 2005), http://oreilly.com/pub/a/web2/
archive/what-is-web-20.html?page=3. Blogs can reveal a wealth of private information and are,
therefore, a tremendous privacy concern.
16. See, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 454 (Del. 2005) (involving a blog operator who
maintained a log of commentators' IP addresses).
17. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 687 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (expressing con-
cern for the privacy of searches for sexually explicit material).
18. See id. (noting that the government may be forced to investigate such a query); see also
Omer Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1433,
1442 ("Google records all search queries linked to a specific Internet Protocol (IP) address.").
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Although these logs are scattered across the vast reaches of the In-
ternet,19 there are important middlemen with access to it all: Internet
Service Providers (ISPs).20 ISPs assign IP addresses to their subscrib-
ers, logging who is using what address at any given time.21 ISPs are
the gatekeepers of access to not only the Internet but also to the iden-
tification of any particular user.22 By comparing its own IP address
logs to those maintained by the Internet's Web servers, 23 an ISP can
readily link online activity to a specific subscriber account and, poten-
tially,24 to an individual. 25 This means that ISPs "have the power to
obliterate privacy online. Everything we say, hear, read, or do on the
Internet first passes through ISP computers." 26
Herein lies the concern for privacy. Although data logs maintained
by Web site operators typically correlate online activity only to an IP
address, that address may be traced backwards to expose the individ-
ual behind the computer.27 While various federal statutes protect sim-
ilar data such as telephone numbers and mailing addresses as
Personally Identifiable Information (PII), federal privacy law does not
generally regard IP addresses as information worthy of protection. 28
It has, therefore, become commonplace for litigants to subpoena ISPs
19. See Gandy, supra note 14, at 1093; Helms, supra note 9, at 296.
20. See Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 1417,
1420.
21. United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1042 (11th Cir. 2003); see also In re Charter
Commc'ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771, 774 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that only an ISP can link an IP to an
individual).
22. See Solove, supra note 9, at 1143 (stating that the ISP "holds the key" to user anonymity);
see also Cahill v. Doe, 879 A.2d 943, 955 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005) ("[T]he ISP can readily provide
the identity of its subscriber(s). But this does not mean in all instances that it should be com-
pelled to do so."), rev'd, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
23. Because ISPs also have the ability to record what Web sites their subscribers visit, such
comparison may not be necessary in all circumstances. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in
Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1233 (1998). If the ISP chooses to maintain IP
address logs, it can link a user to his traffic without the aid of the Web site operators or other
data aggregators. See, e.g., Klimas v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, Inc., 465 F.3d 271, 273 (6th Cir.
2006) (involving an ISP that temporarily stored data listing its subscribers' Web site visits).
24. If multiple users access the Internet via the same subscriber account, the IP address will
likely identify all of their Internet traffic and will not, therefore, be perfectly linked to any indi-
vidual user. Frederick Lah, Are IP Addresses "Personally Identifiable Information"?, 4 I/S J. L.
& PoL'Y FOR THE INFO. Soc'Y 681, 700-01 (2008). There may be enough of a link, however, to
provide probable cause for a criminal investigation of the account owner. See infra notes 205-24
and accompanying text.
25. See Helms, supra note 9, at 296.
26. Ohm, supra note 20, at 1420.
27. See Tene, supra note 18, at 1450 ("[S]earch-query logs ... become privacy threatening if
they can be traced back to a specific user.").
28. See Paige Norian, The Struggle to Keep Personal Data Personal: Attempts to Reform On-
line Privacy and How Congress Should Respond, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 803, 811 (2003) (noting
that the "patchwork" nature of federal privacy law left "significant gaps in online privacy").
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to unmask online speakers.29 Many ISPs have no reason to fight these
subpoenas30 and readily give up their subscribers' names, addresses,
telephone numbers, and other identifying data without demanding
any court oversight or providing any notice to the subscriber.3 1 Even
when courts become involved, a full consideration of the online
speaker's privacy interests is far from certain.32
While it would be improper-and dangerous-to provide online ac-
tors a blanket of complete anonymity,33 the routine reporting of infor-
mation linking individuals to their online activity is a major privacy
concern. 34 For now, much of this data collection occurs "without our
awareness, much less our approval."35 As society becomes more
aware of this reporting, however, individuals may begin to censor
their online conduct for fear of censure or liability, substantially un-
dermining the right to free speech and the free exchange of ideas. 3 6
This Comment explores the possibility of protecting the IP address
itself as PII,37 putting the IP address in the same category as a home
29. Shaun B. Spencer, CyberSLAPP Suits and John Doe Subpoenas: Balancing Anonymity
and Accountability in Cyberspace, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 493, 493 (2000); see,
e.g., State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26, 29 (N.J. 2008).
30. See James X. Dempsey, Digital Search & Seizure: Standards for Government Access to
Communications and Associated Data, in 2 TENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY DATA SE-
CURITY L. 687, 703 (2009).
31. See Spencer, supra note 29, at 493; see also Dempsey, supra note 30, at 718 ("If the govern-
ment obtains from the search engine the IP addresses associated with particular queries, it can
compel ISPs to identify those individuals.").
32. See Matthew Mazzotta, Note, Balancing Act: Finding Consensus on Standards for Un-
masking Anonymous Internet Speakers, 51 B.C. L. REv. 833, 855-59 (2010) (examining the
emerging discovery standards for unmasking online speakers and noting that "only one standard
in the survey requires a court to consider the anonymous speaker's expectation of privacy").
33. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) ("The right to remain
anonymous may be abused when it shields fraudulent conduct."); Lidsky, supra note 5, at 884
(noting that an anonymous online speaker could "inflict serious harm on [a] corporation" by
"pollut[ing] the information stream with defamatory falsehoods, which may in turn influence
other investors to question the corporation's credibility or financial health").
34. See Kang, supra note 23, at 1193 ("The potential for wide-ranging surveillance of all our
cyber-activities presents a serious threat to information privacy."); cf McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 355
(stating that the "identification of the author [of a political handbill] against her will is particu-
larly intrusive . . . [because] it reveals unmistakably the content of her thoughts on a controver-
sial issue").
35. Nicholas Carr, The Great Privacy Debate: Tracking Is an Assault on Liberty, with Real
Dangers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7-8, 2010, at W1.
36. See Cahill v. Doe, 879 A.2d 943, 952 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005) ("[If subpoenas can be ob-
tained merely by filing suit, people will be reluctant to speak their mind knowing that their
anonymity is tenuous and that retribution for whatever they might say is all the more likely."),
rev'd, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005); Lidsky, supra note 5, at 861 ("Internet defamation actions
threaten not only to deter the individual who is sued from speaking out, but also to encourage
undue self-censorship among the other John Does who frequent Internet discussion fora.").
37. This is not a novel concept, as some commentators have expressed support for recognizing
an IP address as PII. See, e.g., Tene, supra note 18, at 1446 ("[E]ven a dynamic address is per-
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address, telephone number, or Social Security number and providing
it and the corresponding user protection under current federal privacy
law. Part II of this Comment outlines the relevant technical aspects of
IP addresses38 and the many definitions and examples of PII.3 9 Part
III argues that IP addresses are functionally similar to other types of
P11 and should be protected when in the hands of an ISP or otherwise
correlated to identifying information. The argument proceeds by ex-
amining what it means for data to be "personally identifiable," 4 0 when
IP addresses can and cannot be linked to individuals, 41 and how IP
addresses are being protected at the state, federal, and international
levels.42 Finally, Part IV examines the predominate subpoena stan-
dards by which a litigant may unmask an anonymous online speaker,43
as well as the current lack of Fourth Amendment protection for sub-
scriber information on file with ISPs,44 and anticipates how recogniz-
ing an IP address as PII may affect these standards and future
litigation.45
II. BACKGROUND
This Part reviews the basics of IP addresses, including some techni-
cal limitations that are later examined-and rejected-as possible bar-
riers to identifying an individual based upon his IP address.46 It also
examines the various definitions of P11 4 7 and the types of data that are
traditionally protected by federal law because they have the potential
to identify a particular individual.48 .
A. IP Addresses and Related Technology
An IP address is a string of four numbers, each ranging from 0 to
255,49 that serves as a unique identifier on a network to facilitate on-
sonally identifiable in cyberspace, given the ability of a user's ISP to link such an address to the
individual (or company) that used it."); see also Helms, supra note 9, at 296 ("[Olne only needs
the TCP/IP address and a cooperative ISP to link online activity to a user's biological identity.").
38. See infra notes 49-75 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 76-114 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 118-30 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 131-230 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 231-63 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 273-324 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 325-50 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 351-77 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 49-75 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 76-114 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 82-97 and accompanying text.
49. United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1144 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007). An example would
be 74.125.95.99, which is the IP address assigned to one of the servers hosting http://
www.google.com as of this writing.
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line communications.50 An IP address is tied to a computer, not its
user,51 and will normally not change when a new user logs in.5 2 In this
way, an IP address is analogous to a physical mailing address, which is
required for the sending and receiving of postal mail.53 However, un-
like an envelope, which need not contain a return address to convey
its message to the recipient, every Internet communication must con-
tain both the sending and receiving IP addresses.54 Because of the
Internet Protocol, users communicate their return addresses to the
world whether or not they know of or want this transparency.55
Although there are approximately four billion addresses in the cur-
rent Internet Protocol, 56 many of these are reserved or unassignable,57
and most of the useable addresses have already been assigned.58 As a
result, methods have been developed to share the limited number of
remaining, viable addresses. 59 The two methods relevant here are dy-
namic addressing and Network Address Translation.
Critical network resources, such as servers and printers, are often
given "static," or permanent, addresses so that they are easily found
by other devices on the computer network.60 Most end-user com-
puters, however, are provided a "dynamic" address selected out of a
pool and administered by an ISP.61 An ISP may have more customers
than it has assignable addresses, but dynamic addressing allows it to
provide an address only to those users connected at any given time.62
When a user disconnects, his address is put back in the pool and may
50. Klimas v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, Inc., 465 F.3d 271, 273 (6th Cir. 2006); United States
v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1042 (11th Cir. 2003).
51. Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093FMCJCX, 2007 WL 2080419, at *3
n.10 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2007); see also Helms, supra note 9, at 296 n.44.
52. See Alma Whitten, Are IP Addresses Personal?, GOOGLE PuB. POL'Y BLOG (Feb. 22,
2008, 12:31 PM), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2008/02/are-ip-addresses-personal.html
("[I]f you share your computer or even just your connection to your ISP with your family, then
multiple people are sharing one IP address.").
53. See State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26, 33 (N.J. 2008).
54. Id.
55. See Gandy, supra note 14, at 1093.
56. Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together, and the
Forces Tearing It Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 343, 361 (2008).
57. Due to the structure of IP addressing, certain addresses cannot be used on the Internet.
This reduces the assignable address space from the theoretical maximum of more than four bil-
lion. See id.
58. See id.; see also Lah, supra note 24, at 690.
59. Werbach, supra note 56, at 361.
60. See Lah, supra note 24, at 690.
61. Id. at 690-91; Tene, supra note 18, at 1446. The protocol that enables dynamic addressing
is known as DHCP, which stands for Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol. Lah, supra note 24,
at 689.
62. State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26, 28 (N.J. 2008); Cahill v. Doe, 879 A.2d 943, 948 (Del. Super. Ct.
2005), rev'd, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
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later be assigned to a different user.63 Dynamic addressing allows a
large number of computers to share a small number of addresses.
The current Internet Protocol is further modified by a protocol
called Network Address Translation, or NAT. 6 4 NAT allows network
administrators to assign a single public IP address to the router or
modem that provides the central point of access to the Internet.65 All
of the computers and devices connected to that router are then given
a local, private IP address. 66 To the internal network administrator,
all of the computers retain separately identifiable IP addresses and
can be tracked down with these numbers.6 7 To the world, however,
hundreds or even thousands of internal computers appear as a single
public IP address. 68 No matter which computer accesses a Web site,
the Web site will see only the address of the router.69
While dynamic addressing and NAT have slowed address exhaus-
tion, the current Internet Protocol is expected to be completely
assigned by 2011 or 2012.70 As a result, the transition to the new
Internet Protocol, called IPv6, 71 will soon be accelerated. Unlike
current IP addresses, many IPv6 addresses will include a unique
code dictated by a computer's hardware, in effect making IPv6
addresses globally unique and permanently assigned to particu-
lar devices.72 IPv6 is unlikely to suffer from the address exhaus-
tion that plagues the current protocol: the new system
creates a 128-bit address, providing for approximately 340 undecil-
63. See Whitten, supra note 52.
64. Helms, supra note 9, at 318. For the technical proposal, see Kjeld Borch Egevang & Paul
Francis, The IP Network Address Translator (NAT) (Network Working Group, Request for
Comments No. 1631) (May 1994), available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfcl631.txt.
65. Helms, supra note 9, at 318.
66. See Jonathan Weinberg, Hardware-Based ID, Rights Management, and Trusted Systems, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1251, 1260 n.22 (2000).
67. Because the link is made with reference to a Media Access Control (MAC) address-a
physical address that cannot normally be altered-the network administrator may track down an
internal computer even if the internal address changes. See, e.g., United States v. Heckenkamp,
482 F.3d 1142, 1144 (9th Cir. 2007) (university's network investigator traced an internal IP ad-
dress to a specific dorm room and then to a specific user even after the user had altered his
internal address).
68. See Paul Ham, Warrantless Search and Seizure of E-Mail and Methods of Panoptical Pro-
phylaxis, B.C. L. IrELL. PROP. & TECH. F. & J., Sept. 2008, at 1, 14.
69. See id.; Helms, supra note 9, at 318.
70. Werbach, supra note 56, at 361.
71. Id. at 361-62.
72. Weinberg, supra note 66, at 1260-61; see also Helms, supra note 9, at 299 (indicating that
the uniqueness of IPv6 addresses will "mak[e] it nearly impossible for people to remain anony-
mous on the Internet").
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lion-340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000-possible
addresses.73
Whether the address is from the current or future Internet Protocol,
the take-away points are few. An IP address is assigned to a computer
or other device accessing the Internet and is communicated between
devices as part of the normal data exchange. 74 Some of these devices,
especially those that host Web sites, record these numbers for future
use. 75
B. Defining Personally Identifiable Information
Determining what kinds of data should be protected under federal
privacy law remains difficult, as there is no single definition of PII.76
To date, Congress has rejected comprehensive privacy legislation in
favor of a large collection of statutes, each of which protects specific
types of information in particular circumstances.77 The Children's
Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), for example, regulates the
online collection of information from children under the age of thir-
teen78 but applies only if the Web site is directed to children or the
operators have actual knowledge that their visitors are not of age. 7 9
The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 protects the disclosure of a
customer's video rental recordso but may not protect similar records
collected online. 8'
These privacy statutes enumerate the data that they are enacted to
protect, and these bits of information can be divided into three dis-
tinct groups.82 The first group consists of information that is com-
73. How to Say the IPv6 Number, ELAMB SECURITY BLOG (Dec. 12, 2006), http://elamb.org/
howto-say-the-ipv6-number.
74. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
75. United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1042 (11th Cir. 2003); State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26,
29 (N.J. 2008).
76. Lah, supra note 24, at 684.
77. Id.; Berman & Mulligan, supra note 10, at 567; Norian, supra note 28, at 811.
78. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501, 6502 (2006).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1); Corey A. Ciocchetti, E-Commerce and Informational Privacy: Pri-
vacy Policies as Personal Information Protectors, 44 Am. Bus. L.J. 55, 75 (2007); Norian, supra
note 28, at 816-17.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006).
81. In 2008, the Southern District of New York refused to apply the Act when it compelled
the production of logs linking YouTube visitors to their viewing records. Viacom Int'l Inc. v.
YouTube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256, 262 & n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see also infra notes 361-68 and accom-
panying text.
82. See S. REP. No. 107-240, at 2-3 (2002) ("Taken together, these laws appear designed ... to
ensure that certain types of information collection are fair, transparent, and subject to law.").
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monly protected because it can identify a specific individual: names,83
home addresses, 84 e-mail addresses,85 telephone numbers, 86 and Social
Security numbers. 87 The second group contains data that is easily
combined with P11,88 acts as P11,89 or is central to the purpose of the
enacting statute. This second group includes dates of birth,90 photo-
graphs,9' video rental records, 92 driver's license numbers,93 biometric
data,94 and alien registration numbers or other unique identification
numbers.95 In the third group is aggregate data, which is a collection
of data that "does not identify particular persons." 96 Aggregate data
typically is not viewed as privacy-threatening and is usually excluded
from protection. 97
Some commentators believe this enumerative approach to privacy
law fails to protect important pieces of private data.98 Statutory at-
tempts at defining PII,99 "personal information," oo or "means of iden-
tification,"101 however, have provided little direction in determining
83. Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8)(A); False Identifi-
cation Crime Control Act of 1982, 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7)(A); Driver's Privacy Protection Act of
1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8)(C).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8)(D); 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8)(E); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(d)(7)(A), 2725(3).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8)(G).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8)(F) (protecting as personal information "any other identifier that the
Commission determines permits the physical or online contacting of a specific individual").
"Online contact information" is further defined as "an e-mail address or another substantially
similar identifier that permits direct contact with a person online." § 6501(12).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7)(A).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3).
92. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3).
93. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(d)(7)(A), 2725(3).
94. § 1028(d)(7)(B).
95. § 1028(d)(7)(A).
96. Cable Communication Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551(a)(2)(A) (2006).
97. See, e.g., id.; see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(a) (2009) ("Health information that does not
identify an individual and with respect to which there is no reasonable basis to believe that the
information can be used to identify an individual is not individually identifiable health
information.").
98. See Robert Sprague & Corey Ciocchetti, Preserving Identities: Protecting Personal Identi-
fying Information Through Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws, 19 ALB. L.J. Sct. & TECH. 91,
118 (2009) (noting that the laws "miss a vast amount of data stored by merchants and various
businesses"). Others have labeled the mass of statutes a "[clobweb [flull of [hioles," Tene, supra
note 18, at 1476, or a "patchwork" with "significant gaps," Norian, supra note 28, at 811.
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3); 47 U.S.C. § 551(a)(2)(A).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8); 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7).
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what other types of information should be protected. 102 COPPA, for
example, merely defines personal information as "individually identi-
fiable information about an individual." 1 0 3 Likewise, the Stored Com-
munications Privacy Act defines personal information as "information
that identifies an individual." 1 0 4
In recent years, Congress has attempted to create new definitions of
P11 that would specifically address online privacy concerns,105 but the
bills carrying these failed in their respective houses.10 6 The Online
Personal Privacy Act of 2002 would have largely followed COPPA's
definition of P11 07 but would have excluded any information inferred
from the data actually collected.108 The accompanying Senate Report
gave an example: if a particular user purchased a book about diabetes
from an online retailer, the name, address, and other information pro-
vided to assist the delivery of that book would be PII, but the infer-
ence that the user has diabetes or a particular interest in diabetes
would not be PII.109
The Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2002 would have defined
PII as "individually identifiable information relating to a living indi-
vidual who can be identified from that information." 10 The Act
would have excluded from protection any anonymous data, inferred
data, or data obtained from public records."'
Because of the confusion in what should be protected as personal
data, other entities have constructed their own definitions. The Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC), for example, defined "personal infor-
mation" in a consent order requiring TJX Companies, the parent
company of T.J. Maxx and other discount department stores, to pro-
102. Thus, many scholars have used the statutes to craft their own definitions. See, e.g., Tene,
supra note 18, at 1445 (defining PII as "information which can be used to uniquely identify,
contact, or locate a specific individual person").
103. 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8).
104. 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3).
105. See Online Personal Privacy Act, S. 2201, 107th Cong. § 401 (2002); Consumer Privacy
Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4678, 107th Cong. § 401 (2002).
106. Ciocchetti, supra note 79, at 98-99. For a comparison of the two bills, see Norian, supra
note 28, at 822-27, 831-35.
107. Compare Online Personal Privacy Act, S. 2201 § 401 ("The term 'personally identifiable
information' means individually identifiable information about an individual collected online
. . . ."), with 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8) ("The term 'personal information' means individually identifi-
able information about an individual collected online . . .
108. S. 2201 § 401.
109. S. REP. No. 107-240, at 40 (2002).
110. H.R. 4678 § 401(4A).
111. Id.
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tect its customers with reasonable security measures.112 Among the
classic examples of PII identified by the FTC were a person's name,
address, telephone number, and Social Security number.113 The order
went further, demanding that TJX protect its customers' e-mail ad-
dresses, other online contact information, credit or debit card num-
bers, and "persistent identifier[s]," "such as a customer number held
in a 'cookie.' "114
While several new laws at both the federal and state level have be-
gun to recognize the identifying power of IP addresses, most courts
continue to refuse to classify them as PII. The remainder of this Com-
ment argues that Congress should adopt-and courts should recog-
nize-a definition of PII that incorporates and protects a user's IP
address when it may be linked to that user's identifying information.
III. IP ADDRESSES ACTING AS PERSONALLY
IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION
This Part examines the circumstances in which an IP address should
be recognized as P11. Because an IP address is similar in form to other
P11 and can be used to identify an individual and his online activity, it
should be protected as P11 when in the hands of an ISP or otherwise
correlated to personal information about the user.115 When an IP ad-
dress cannot be linked to an individual, such as when it is stored by
Web servers without any of the user's contact information, it should
not be regarded as personal data.116 This conclusion is supported by
the apparent overall purpose of federal privacy law: to protect data
only when it may be linked to a particular individual." 7
112. In re The TJX Cos., No. 072 3055, at 2 (F.T.C. Mar. 27, 2008). In that case, an intruder
breached TJX's insufficient electronic security measures and stole an estimated ninety-four mil-
lion customer records, which contained credit card numbers, Social Security numbers, and
driver's license numbers. Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 98, at 97-100. See also Martin B.
Robins, Intellectual Property and Information Technology Due Diligence in Mergers and Acquisi-
tions: A More Substantive Approach Needed, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. POL'Y 321, 351 n.161 (indi-
cating that the FTC's definition is "often used interchangeably" with statutory definitions of
P11).
113. In re The TJX Cos., No. 072 3055, at 2 (F.T.C. Mar. 27, 2008).
114. Id. A "cookie" is a file stored on the user's hard drive that contains a unique identifying
number and other information, such as the user's preferred settings and the previous Web sites
he visited. Michelle Z. Hall, Internet Privacy or Information Piracy: Spinning Lies on the World
Wide Web, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. Rrs. 609, 614-15 (2002). Cookies are a privacy concern
because they can communicate a wealth of information to Web sites and may do so without the
user's consent. Id.
115. See infra notes 167-230 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 131-66 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 118-30 and accompanying text.
2011] 905
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:895
A. P11 Is Information That Has the Potential to
Identify an Individual
As examined above, Congress has found it difficult to clearly define
PII and the types of data that should be protected.118 There is an
inherent conflict between enumerating bright-line examples of PII
and protecting data only when it identifies an individual in practice. 119
In fact, four of the most protected pieces of data need not identify a
single person: multiple people may have the same name,120 multiple
residents may share the same home address and telephone number,
and multiple users may log in to the same e-mail address.121 Date of
birth, which is listed as a "means of identification" under the False
Identification Crime Control Act,122 is arguably the least tied to a sin-
gle individual because of the vast number of people who share the
same birthday. Of the most commonly listed examples of PII, only a
Social Security number appears to be completely tied to one individ-
ual. 123 In contrast, biometric data, "such as fingerprint, voice print,
retina or iris image,"124 is probably the most effective type of PII due
to its uniqueness but is rarely listed as PII among the statutes.
Taken together, 125 the various definitions and examples of PIT sug-
gest that what is meant by "personally identifiable information" is not
a piece of data that always identifies an individual but a piece of data
that could identify an individual given the totality of the circum-
118. See supra notes 76-111 and accompanying text.
119. See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Per-
sonal Data, 01248/07/ENIWP136, at 13-15 (June 20, 2007) [hereinafter WP136] (discussing how
the ability of particular types of data to identify a person depends upon the circumstances).
120. Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant, Kli-
mas v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, Inc., (No. 02-CV-72054-DT), at 3-4, available at http://w2.eff.
org/Privacy/20040408_Klimas v_ComcastAmicusBrief.pdf [hereinafter EFF Amicus Brief].
121. E-mail addresses may be shared, for example, by multiple people in one household
(familyname@serviceprovider.com) or by multiple employees who sign in to a generic company
account (info@company.com).
122. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7)(A) (2006).
123. Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 98, at 93. A Social Security number is, of course, not
intrinsically personally identifiable but is rather made so by accurately and consistently record-
ing the link between the number and an individual. See Kang, supra note 23, at 1208. Thus, even
this form of PII is not personally identifiable by itself.
124. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7).
125. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3) (defining personal information as "information that identi-
fies an individual" (emphasis added)), with H.R. 4678 § 401, 107th Cong. (2002) (defining PH as
"information relating to a living individual who can be identified from that information" (empha-
sis added)). See also 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(a) (2009) (excluding from the definition of individually
identifiable health information any data to which there is "no reasonable basis to believe that the
information can be used to identify an individual" (emphasis added)).
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stances.126 When aggregated, even trivial data may help identify a
person, making that data collectively worthy of protection. 127
If this is the proper definition of PII, privacy law should seek to
protect any data that could identify an individual, excusing that data
from protection only if it is rendered sufficiently anonymous or inca-
pable of identifying an individual in practice. 128 Because it may be
impossible to determine, ex ante, whether a particular piece of infor-
mation will actually identify an individual, precautions must be taken
to protect information that is likely to do so. 12 9 Federal privacy stat-
utes appear to address this concern by providing protection to bits of
data-such as name, phone number, and house address-that are
widely considered personal even if they do not always point to a spe-
cific individual. 130
This understanding of what it means for information to be "person-
ally identifiable" supports a detailed examination of when IP ad-
dresses can and cannot be linked to individuals. As the following
Sections explore, an IP address should not be considered personal
data by itself, but it may become personally identifiable when corre-
lated to other data about an individual.
126. See 1-2A Computer Law § 2A.02, at 16 (2009) ("A person can be identified . . . by a
combination of significant criteria that permits narrowing down the group to which he or she
belongs . . . . Whether an individual is identified depends on the circumstances."); EFF Amicus
Brief, supra note 120, at 5-8 (distinguishing "personally identifiable" from "personally identify-
ing," the former being capable of identifying a person and the later actually identifying a person).
127. "What seems nonsensitive in isolation becomes sensitive in aggregation." Kang, supra
note 23, at 1289 n.370. The danger aggregated data poses to individual privacy is demonstrated
by a scandal involving the online video rental service, Netflix. In 2006, as part of a contest to
improve its movie recommendation service, Netflix released 100 million records revealing the
viewing and rating habits of 500,000 of its users. Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust
De-Anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets, 2008 IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY 111,
available at http://www.cs.utexas.edu/-shmat/shmat-oak08netflix.pdf. The company had in-
tended to remove all identifying information linking the habits to specific users, but a subsequent
study showed that 84% of the users could be re-identified with the released data. Id. (conclud-
ing that, even if users are not overly concerned about the release of their movie ratings, the
disclosure presented privacy concerns because "it is possible to learn sensitive non-public infor-
mation about a person from his or her movie viewing history").
128. See WP136, supra note 119, at 15 ("If ... [the] possibility [to single out an individual]
does not exist or is negligible, the person should not be considered as 'identifiable,' and the
information would not be considered as 'personal data."'); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (health
privacy rule allowing release of medical information only after it is scrubbed of identifying data);
H.R. 5777, 111th Cong. § 501(a)(2) (2010) (online privacy bill excluding from protection any
information that has been obscured so as not to identify particular individuals).
129. See WP136, supra note 119, at 17 (reasoning that an ISP should protect IP addresses as
personal data unless it knows "with absolute certainty" that a particular user cannot be
identified).
130. See supra notes 82-97 and accompanying text.
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B. By Itself an IP Address Is Not Personal Data
An IP address cannot identify an individual by itself because it is
merely a string of numbers. 131 Instead, it must be correlated to other
information about the user, such as addressing logs maintained by
ISPs.132 Privacy law should not, therefore, protect IP addresses when
they are not correlated to other PII, such as when they are maintained
by Web site operators in normal network traffic logs.
In 2006, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had an opportunity to
examine whether an IP address could qualify as P11 in the case Klimas
v. Comcast Cable Communications, Inc.'3 3 An Internet subscriber al-
leged that his ISP, Comcast, violated the Cable Communications Pol-
icy Act by creating and storing a database linking each user's IP
address to the Web sites he visited. 134 The subscriber claimed that
Comcast had the ability to correlate this database with its addressing
database linking each subscriber to his IP address and could, there-
fore, associate online activity with the actual identity of its subscrib-
ers. 3 5 The parties agreed that the dispositive issue was whether an IP
address could be PII as defined in the Act.136
The district court first ruled that dynamic IP addresses, such as
those stored in Comcast's database, are not PII because "a dynamic IP
address is constantly changing. . . . [U]nless an IP address is correlated
to some other information, such as Comcast's log of IP addresses as-
signed to its subscribers . . . it does not identify any single subscriber
by itself." 37 The court granted Comcast's motion to dismiss, reason-
ing that an IP address could not be P11 as defined in the statute absent
evidence of actual correlation with the subscriber information.' 38
While ultimately affirming the district court's dismissal of the case,
the Sixth Circuit avoided addressing the question of PII by holding
that Comcast, as a provider of broadband Internet service, was not an
operator of a "cable system" as defined in the Act.139 The court
noted, however, that not all IP addresses are dynamic, and while "IP
addresses do not in and of themselves" reveal a subscriber's identity,
that information could be "gleaned if a list of individual subscribers is
131. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
132. See Klimas v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, Inc., 465 F.3d 271, 276 n.2 (6th Cir. 2006).
133. Id. at 271.
134. Id. at 273.
135. Id. at 274.
136. Klimas v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, Inc., No. 02-CV-72054-DT, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27765, at *8 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2003).
137. Id. at *10.
138. Id. at *10-11.
139. Klimas, 465 F.3d at 273.
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matched up with a list of their individual IP addresses." 1 4 0 The court
stated that the collection of data linking a subscriber's IP address to
the Web sites he visited could be a proper injury under the Act only if
this information was subsequently correlated to subscriber identi-
ties. 14 1 The court pointed to the Act's language that "aggregate data
which does not identify particular persons" cannot be P11.142 Without
a correlation between databases, Comcast could not link its subscrib-
ers to their online conduct.143
While the Sixth Circuit did not have an opportunity to rule whether
an IP address is PII within the definition of the Cable Communica-
tions Policy Act, the court's language makes clear that under its stan-
dard, an IP address by itself is not personally identifiable, while an IP
address correlated to subscriber information could be P11.
This conclusion is fairly intuitive.144 An IP address is only a group
of four numbers between 0 and 255; the address is not intended to
have any special relationship with an individual but is instead dis-
persed at random from a pool of available addresses maintained by
the ISP.145 Because the address may change whenever the user con-
nects to the Internet, the use of any particular address will be mea-
sured in hours, days, or weeks but will not become permanent in most
circumstances.146 Without a correlation to other identifying informa-
tion, an IP address is only a number and cannot point to the identity
of an individual user.147
This fact does not, however, support completely excluding IP ad-
dresses from the list of personal data. As examined above, most of
the data typically regarded as "personally identifiable" has no inher-
ent connection to an individual.148 A street address does not contain
140. Id. at 276 n.2.
141. Id. at 276, 280.
142. Id. at 280 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 551(a)(2)(A) (2006)).
143. Id.
144. See 1-2A Computer Law § 2A.02 n.4 ("An IP address standing alone would merit only
the lowest degree of security."); see also Whitten, supra note 52 ("[T]he IP addresses recorded
by every Web site on the planet without additional information should not be considered per-
sonal data, because these Web sites usually cannot identify the human beings behind these num-
ber strings.").
145. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
146. See Lah, supra note 24, at 689; Weinberg, supra note 66, at 1260 & n.24; see also United
States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 523 (3d Cir. 2010) ("Comcast's . . . 'lease period' for each IP
address is approximately 6-8 days. At the expiration of that lease period, the assignment of an
address to a particular computer may or may not be renewed.").
147. Klimas, 465 F.3d at 276 n.2.
148. See Tene, supra note 18, at 1446 (comparing IP addresses to mailing addresses and tele-
phone numbers, which are PII only when they "might be linked to a specific individual through
reasonable means").
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the name of the person living there. Telephone numbers, Social Se-
curity numbers, and driver's license numbers are, like IP addresses,
simply numerical sequences. 149 Most of the information protected by
federal statute as personally identifiable must be correlated to other
data in order to actually identify an individual.150 IP addresses, there-
fore, are not unique in their need for correlation to other data to
render them protectable PII.1st
C. IP Addresses Are Assigned to Computers, Not People
Some courts have refused to recognize an IP address as PII because
the number is assigned to a computer rather than to a particular user.
The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, in ruling
on a motion to preserve and produce logs of IP addresses that had
been used to download copyrighted music files, noted, "As an IP ad-
dress identifies a computer, rather than a specific user of a computer,
it is not clear that IP addresses ... are encompassed by the term 'per-
sonal information.'"152 Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, faced with an allegation that
Microsoft violated its own privacy policy by storing its customers' IP
addresses, held that an IP address is not personally identifiable. 5 3
The court reasoned that, "[i]n order . . . to be personally identifiable,
[information] must identify a person. But an IP address identifies a
computer, and can do that only after matching the IP address to a list
of a particular Internet service provider's subscribers."1 54
These decisions rely too heavily on a colloquial understanding of
the words "personally identifiable" without examining the qualities of
other PII.155 It is true that an IP address is assigned to a computer,
not a person.156 This rationale is equally applicable, however, to other
types of data that federal statutes nonetheless protect as PII. A house
149. See EFF Amicus Brief, supra note 120, at 3 ("[W]ithout the equivalent of a reverse tele-
phone directory, a person's telephone number is just a telephone number.").
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093FMCJCX, 2007 WL 2080419, at *3
n.10 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2007). The court examined the question under the defendant's privacy
policy rather than a federal statute. Id. Problematically, the defendant did not provide the court
with a definition of the term "personal information" as used in its policy. Id.
153. Johnson v. Microsoft Corp., No. C06-0900RAJ, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58174, at *13
(W.D. Wash. June 23, 2009).
154. Id. at *12-13.
155. See supra notes 82-97 and accompanying text.
156. See Bunnell, 2007 WL 2080419, at *3 n.10; Helms, supra note 9, at 296 n.46.
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address, for example, is assigned to a building, not a person.'57 A tele-
phone number is assigned to a telephone line, not a person.'58 An e-
mail address identifies an electronic mailbox stored on a computer
hard drive, and a date of birth identifies a specific day in history.
These types of information may be personally identifiable in some
circumstances but not in others.159 If only one person lived at a partic-
ular house address or had access to a specific telephone, the address
and telephone number would be directly linked to that person. It
would be reasonable, for example, to attribute calls made from a par-
ticular cell phone number to the individual who carries the phone
every day. Attributing a call to a particular individual may not be fair,
however, if many people have ready access to the phone.160
Whether or not these pieces of data identify an individual on their
own, they often can identify an individual when aggregated. 161 As one
study found, combining a gender, a birthdate, and a ZIP code is
enough to uniquely identify 87% of the United States population.162
It is prudent, therefore, to provide more protection to compilations of
data than that afforded individual bits of information.163
IP addresses present the same possibilities: they may be closely
linked with a particular person and may become personally identifi-
able when combined with other PII.164 When an IP address can be
associated with a particular computer to which one person or a small
number of persons has access, the IP address becomes more akin to
157. Therefore, an address may not be personally identifiable in some circumstances, such as
when it identifies an apartment building but not the particular apartment. See Tene, supra note
18, at 1446.
158. When a telephone is available for use by more than one person, the calls made from the
telephone are less likely to be fairly attributable to an individual. See Nancy J. King, When
Mobile Phones Are RFID-Equipped: Finding E. U.-U.S. Solutions to Protect Consumer Privacy
and Facilitate Mobile Commerce, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 107, 181 n.287 (2008).
159. See WP136, supra note 119, at 13 ("[T]he question of whether the individual to whom the
information relates is identified or not depends on the circumstances of the case.").
160. See King, supra note 158, at 181 n.287.
161. See Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 98, at 93.
162. Latanya Sweeney, Computational Disclosure Control: A Primer on Data Privacy Protec-
tion 20 (Jan. 8, 2001), available at http://groups.csail.mit.edulmac/classes/6.805/articles/privacy/
sweeney-thesis-draft.pdf; see also Seth Schoen, What Information Is "Personally Identifiable"?,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Sept. 11, 2009), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/091
what-information-personally-identifiable; Kang, supra note 23, at 1289 n.370 ("[T]he true privacy
threat arises from the systematic, detailed aggregation of otherwise trivial data that allows the
construction of a telling personal profile.").
163. See Ciocchetti, supra note 79, at 56.
164. Compare Gandy, supra note 14, at 1093 ("[It is in the nature of the Internet Protocol
(IP) that personally identifiable information is made available for capture in every interaction
between computers."), with King, supra note 158, at 181 ("[C]ertain types of IP addresses that do
not allow identification of the user may not be personal data.").
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traditional P11.165 Unlike other P11, the IP address can go beyond
identification and actually associate a person with the content of his
online activity. 166
D. An IP Address Can Identify an Individual and
His Online Activity
Three primary concerns may lead a court to question whether an IP
address can constitute personally identifiable information. First, most
computers use a dynamic IP address that, by definition, can change. 167
A court may ask how an IP address can be P11 when it may be as-
signed to multiple subscribers in any given timeframe.168 Second, the
Network Address Translation protocol may operate to provide many
computers with a single external IP address, restricting the ability to
track online conduct to a particular computer or user. 169 Third, even
if an IP address were tethered to a single computer,170 the online con-
duct may have been initiated by any person who had access to that
computer and might not, therefore, be fairly attributable to any
individual.171
Courts that have faced these circumstances have had no problem
utilizing IP addresses to attribute online conduct to particular persons.
The following Sections examine why these technical aspects of IP ad-
dressing should not prevent the proper conclusion that IP addresses
may be P11.
1. Dynamic IP Addresses Can Be Traced Back to an Individual
While most computers utilize dynamic IP addresses assigned to
them by an ISP, ISPs commonly log these assignments.172 When pro-
vided with a particular date and time of interest, an ISP can often
determine to which subscriber account a particular IP address was as-
signed.1 73 Because ISPs retain these logs for only a limited amount of
time, the crucial factor in this process is the timeliness of the request
165. See EFF Amicus Brief, supra note 120, at 9.
166. See Berman & Mulligan, supra note 10, at 554 (noting online transactional data, such as
IP address and Web site history, can "reveal the blueprint of an individual's life").
167. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Klimas v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, Inc., No. 02-CV-72054-DT, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 27765, at *10 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2003).
169. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
170. An IP address is tied to a specific computer when the computer uses a static, public IP
address. Lah, supra note 24, at 690.
171. See infra notes 205-24 and accompanying text.
172. United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1042 (11th Cir. 2003).
173. See Klimas v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, Inc., 465 F.3d 271, 273 (6th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1108 (D. Kan. 2000).
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for identification. 174 Nevertheless, most ISPs reassign the same ad-
dress to a subscriber every time he logs on to the network' 7 5 Even
with dynamic addressing, a computer may retain a single IP address
assignment for months at a time.17 6 In practice, then, even dynamic IP
addresses can be associated with particular individuals.1 7 7
In the 2010 case United States v. Vosburgh,178 the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals examined the process by which an ISP links an IP
address back to a particular subscriber. There, an undercover FBI
agent posted a dummy Web link advertising child pornography.17 9
When the defendant clicked on the link, his IP address was recorded
into a log file on the agent's computer.180 In reviewing the trial testi-
mony provided by the defendant's ISP, Comcast, the Third Circuit ex-
plained how the defendant was linked to his IP address.' 8 '
A witness from Comcast . .. explained that Comcast can trace an
IP address back to a particular customer's account, through IP as-
signment logs that go back 180 days. Finally, he testified that be-
tween October 20 and October 30 of 2006, IP address
69.136.100.151 was assigned to an account registered to [the
defendant] .182
Identifying a defendant through IP addressing logs is often a crucial
step in criminal cases arising from online activity. In United States v.
Steiger, for example, an anonymous source provided a police depart-
ment with evidence of child pornography originating from three dy-
namic IP addresses.183 The police department notified the FBI, which
issued a subpoena to the ISP that had assigned the addresses.184 The
ISP reviewed its logs, determined that all three addresses had been
used by the defendant, and provided the FBI with the defendant's
174. See, e.g., United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 523 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that the
defendant's ISP maintained IP assignment logs for 180 days). Note, however, that the FBI is
currently pressuring ISPs to retain assignment logs for as long as two years. Declan McCullagh,
FBI Wants Records Kept of Web Sites Visted, CNET NEWS (Feb. 5, 2010, 9:16 AM), http://
news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10448060-38.html.
175. Weinberg, supra note 66, at 1260 n.24.
176. Id.
177. Tene, supra note 18, at 1446.
178. United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 523 (3d Cir. 2010).
179. Id. at 517.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 523.
182. Id.
183. United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1042 (11th Cir. 2003).
184. Id.
2011]1 913
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
name and home address.1 5 The defendant was indicted and convicted
of various child pornography charges. 86
Identifying an online actor through ISP logs is not limited to crimi-
nal cases. In In re Charter Communications, Inc., more than two hun-
dred file-sharers were personally identified by their dynamic IP
addresses.'87 The Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) used tracking software to discover the IP addresses assigned
to ninety-three Charter subscribers who were suspected of download-
ing and distributing copyrighted music. 8 8 The RIAA obtained sub-
poenas from the district court clerk requiring Charter to release the
names, addresses, and e-mail addresses of the subscribers. 189 Charter
opposed the subpoena, but its motion to quash was denied and the
district court ordered production of the information.190 Charter sub-
sequently released the names and addresses of 150 subscribers who
had been notified of the subpoenas and another 50 to 70 who had not
received notice.191 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals later vacated
the order, reasoning that it had been improperly issued under § 512(h)
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.192 The court ordered the
RIAA to return the data without making any record or any further
use of the subscribers' personal information. 193
2. An IP Address Can Identify an Individual Even on a Private
Network
The commonplace use of Network Address Translation may be seen
as a barrier to identifying an individual with an IP address.194 With
NAT, each computer on an internal network uses a "private" IP ad-
dress, while the entire network shares a "public" IP address.195 This
means that external Web servers will log the one public IP address no
matter which private computer initiated the connection. However,
data logs maintained in the normal course of business will often allow
the private network manager to trace specific transmissions and online
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1043, 1045.
187. See In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2005).
188. Id. at 774.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. The opinion does not explain the discrepancy between the number of subscribers
originally identified by Charter and the number subpoenaed. See id.
192. Id. at 777.
193. Id. at 778.
194. See Weinberg, supra note 66, at 1260 n.22 ("The extent to which .. . traffic can be traced
to [a user behind NAT] . . . depends on the information retained by that server.").
195. See Egevang & Francis, supra note 64, at 1.
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activity to a single internal address in much the same way that an ISP
traces communications on its network to a single subscriber ac-
count.196 As a result, the NAT protocol does not prevent the identifi-
cation of a user when the network manager cooperates with attempts
to track down the source of online activity. 197
The 2007 case United States v. Heckenkamp provides an example. 198
Qualcomm Corporation's computer administrator discovered that the
company's computer systems had been accessed without authoriza-
tion.199 Through a reverse lookup procedure, the administrator deter-
mined that the hacker's public IP address had been assigned to the
University of Wisconsin.200 The administrator contacted the univer-
sity's network investigator, who discovered that the hacker had uti-
lized a computer with a private IP address ending in "117."201 By
cross-referencing the private IP address on multiple university servers,
the investigator discovered that the address had recently been as-
signed to the defendant, an on-campus student.202 After the investiga-
tor physically inspected the defendant's computer to confirm his
findings, the FBI obtained a search warrant to seize the computer.203
The defendant was indicted on multiple counts of recklessly causing
damage through unauthorized access to a computer system in viola-
tion of federal law.2 04
3. An IP Address Can Provide Probable Cause to Suspect an
Individual of Online Activity
The two preceding arguments do not represent any real limitation
on the ability of an IP address to identify an individual, provided that
the appropriate addressing logs are available. The third concern, how-
ever, is not easily dismissed: there may, in fact, be no way to defini-
tively link a particular person with the online conduct emanating from
a particular computer or IP address.205 A user may, for example, ac-
cess online content without ever providing identifying credentials. 206
If many people use a single computer, it would be difficult to attribute
196. See United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007).
197. See Weinberg, supra note 66, at 1260 n.22.
198. See generally Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d at 1142.
199. Id. at 1143.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1144.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1145.
204. Id.
205. See WP136, supra note 119, at 17 (presenting the scenario of an anonymous user of a
computer in an Internet cafe).
206. See King, supra note 158, at 181; see also WP136, supra note 119, at 17.
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online conduct to any one of them based solely on that computer's IP
address. 207
This dilemma may be avoided by requiring some authentication at
the computer terminal.208 When a user signs in to a personal account
by entering a username and password, the authentication process is
logged by either the local computer or the network servers. 209 By
cross-referencing the IP logs with the user authentication logs, a net-
work administrator can identify what user account was signed in at the
time of some questionable online activity. 210 Absent photographs or
video of the person sitting at the computer at the time in question, a
user authentication log is likely to provide the strongest evidence of
who actually accessed the online material.
Even without an authentication log, however, the link between an
IP address and the Internet subscriber may provide enough circum-
stantial evidence to suspect a particular individual of some litigious or
criminal online activity.211 Since 2000, the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals have all held that a search
warrant is supported by probable cause when it uses an IP address and
an ISP logging database to identify a defendant. 212
In the 2007 case United States v. Perez,213 for example, the FBI sub-
poenaed an ISP to obtain the name and home address of a subscriber
whose IP address had recently been used to post child pornography. 214
Upon executing a search warrant on the subscriber's address, the FBI
discovered that three people resided in the house, each maintaining a
separate "occupancy unit."215 The defendant argued that the occu-
pancy by two other persons and the wires running into each bedroom
207. This scenario would be identical to that of the office telephone to which multiple people
have easy access. See King, supra note 158, at 181 n.287.
208. Kang, supra note 23, at 1226; see also CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA PRIVACY
LAw & ONLINE BUSINEsS 50 (2003).
209. KUNER, supra note 208, at 50.
210. Id.
211. See United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1107, 1114 (D. Kan. 2000) (finding the
defendant's admission that he was the primary user of an Internet account provided probable
cause for a search of his computer).
212. United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 526 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that "several Courts
of Appeals have held that evidence that the user of a computer employing a particular IP ad-
dress possessed or transmitted child pornography can support a search warrant for the physical
premises linked to that IP address"); United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 844 (8th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1199-1200, 1206 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Perez,
484 F.3d 735, 740 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Wagers, 452 F.3d 534, 539 (6th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630, 635-36 (9th Cir. 2000).
213. Perez, 484 F.3d at 735.
214. Id. at 738.
215. Id. at 738, 741.
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should have alerted the officers to the possibility that one of the other
housemates had been responsible for the online conduct. 216 On ap-
peal, however, the Fifth Circuit held that the officers had probable
cause to search the defendant's premises, reasoning that the Internet
account had been registered in the defendant's name, which created a
"fair probability" that the defendant was responsible for the online
conduct. 217 The court noted that, although "it was possible that the
transmissions originated outside of the residence to which the IP ad-
dress was assigned, it remained likely that the source of the transmis-
sions was inside that residence." 218
In United States v. Kennedy,219 the FBI obtained a court order di-
recting disclosure of the subscriber information related to an IP ad-
dress assigned to a computer allegedly containing child
pornography.220 The Internet account was registered in a woman's
name but also listed an e-mail address for a man.221 Upon questioning
the man, the FBI determined that he was the primary user of the In-
ternet service. 222 This admission, along with other supporting facts
obtained during the questioning,223 provided probable cause to search
the defendant.224
As the above cases demonstrate, an Internet user can often be iden-
tified by the IP address assigned to his computer despite the alleged
technical barriers. 225 An IP address, then, must be PII when in the
hands of an ISP or another entity that can make the correlation be-
tween the address and the individual. 226 The reservations that some
courts have about recognizing an IP address as PII likely stem from
the fact that only an ISP can consistently correlate an IP address to a
subscriber account. 227 When the IP address is collected by entities
216. Id. at 742.
217. Id. at 744.
218. Id. at 740 (emphasis added).
219. United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (D. Kan. 2000).
220. Id. at 1106-07.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1107-08.
223. The FBI also determined that the defendant liked to download pictures from the Internet
and was suspicious that others were reading his computer files. Id. at 1107. This information
was obtained in a pretextual phone call in which the FBI agent pretended to be a representative
of the defendant's ISP. Id. at 1114.
224. Id.
225. For a useful visual representation of the technical process used to trace IP address assign-
ments, see Helms, supra note 9, at 296.
226. See Aoife White, IP Addresses Are Personal Data, E.U. Regulator Says, WASH. POST,
Jan. 22, 2008, at D1 (paraphrasing Germany's data-protection commissioner as saying "when
someone is identified by an IP . . . address, 'then it has to be regarded as personal data"').
227. See In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771, 774 (8th Cir. 2005).
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other than the ISP, the address must be specifically correlated with
other personal data in order to identify an individual user.2 2 8 If Web
sites do not collect other PII, or do not correlate other P11 to IP ad-
dresses, the Web site owners cannot trace the IP address back to an
individual.229 Regulating the use of IP addresses by these entities
would restrict their legitimate business operations without providing a
significant counterbalancing benefit to user privacy.
This is a clear distinction, and one that may be used to establish
legal rules protecting a user's IP address only when it may act as per-
sonal data. In addition, rules protecting IP addresses only when they
are in the hands of an ISP or are correlated to other PII would fit
within the federal framework of privacy law, which protects data only
when the specific circumstances threaten individual privacy. 230
E. The Movement to Protect IP Addresses
Despite the skepticism, there is a growing movement recognizing
the identifying power of IP addresses. For one, a number of states
have adopted definitions of PII affording protection to IP address in-
formation and the individual behind the computer. 231 In Indiana, for
example, a criminal procedure law protects information that identifies
a victim of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, or stalk-
ing.232 The list of protected information includes the victim's name,
address, telephone number, and IP address.233 Likewise, a Connecti-
cut law lists IP addresses among the "basic subscriber information"
that may be obtained during a criminal investigation of a registered
sex offender only upon judicial order.234
Minnesota's "Internet Privacy" statute is the first state law to ex-
plicitly regulate an ISP's disclosure of its subscribers' personal infor-
mation and browsing habits. 235 The statute defines PII to include any
228. See supra notes 140-50 and accompanying text.
229. See Klimas v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, Inc., No. 02-CV-72054-DT, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 27765, at *10 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2003) ("[U]nless an IP address is correlated to some
other information . . . it does not identify any single subscriber by itself.").
230. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (discussing the limited scope of federal
privacy law).
231. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-260b (2009); IND. CODE § 35-37-6-2.5 (1998); MINN. STAT.
§ 325M.01-09 (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-17-551 (2009); Wis. STAT. § 19.68 (2003).
232. IND. CODE § 35-37-6-2.5.
233. IND. CODE § 35-37-6-2.5(a).
234. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-260b (2009).
235. MINN. STAT. § 325M.02-04; see also Jordan M. Blanke, Minnesota Passes the Nation's
First Internet Privacy Law, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 405, 405, 413 (2003). The
statute also protects "clickstream data," data that indicates where a user has been and how he
found the current Web site. Blanke, supra, at 408-09 & n.18.
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information that (1) identifies a subscriber by "physical or electronic
address or telephone number"; (2) discloses the subscriber's Web site
visits or requested materials; or (3) contains any of the contents of the
subscriber's data-storage devices.236 ISPs are prohibited from releas-
ing this information except in limited circumstances.237 However, be-
cause those circumstances include the issuance of a standard
subpoena, warrant, or court order,238 the actual level of protection af-
forded will continue to depend upon courts' willingness to allow the
identification of online speakers.
The new federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) privacy rule explicitly protects IP addresses. 239 The reg-
ulation allows health providers to release patient information only af-
ter it is scrubbed of all "individually identifiable . . . information." 2 4 0
Data that must be removed includes most of the commonly recog-
nized forms of P11, including telephone numbers, Social Security num-
bers, and biometric data.241 The regulation adds IP addresses to this
list.242
In July of 2010, U.S. Representative Bobby Rush introduced an on-
line privacy bill to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce
that would protect IP address information when it is used to build an
online profile for behavioral advertising.243 In addition to traditional
forms of PII, the Best Practices Act would protect
any unique persistent identifier, such as a customer number, unique
pseudonym or user alias, IP address, or other unique identifier,
where such identifier is used to collect, store or identify information
about a specific individual or to create or maintain a preference
profile. 244
236. MINN. STAT. § 325M.01 (emphasis added).
237. See MINN. STAT. § 325M.02.
238. MINN. STAT. § 325M.03(6), (7).
239. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(0) (2009).
240. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b).
241. Id.
242. Id. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(0).
243. H.R. 5777, 111th Cong. (2010). Behavioral advertising, also known as behavioral target-
ing, "is a method of tracking the online behavior of Internet users in order to serve those con-
sumers with advertising targeted to the specific interests 'expressed' through Web-browsing
activity." Andrew Hotaling, Protecting Personally Identifiable Information on the Internet: No-
tice and Consent in the Age of Behavioral Targeting, 16 CommLAW CONSPECTus 529, 530 (2008).
Behavioral advertising is a controversial practice because of the challenge to expectations of
privacy online. Id.
244. H.R. 5777 § 2(4)(vii).
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The Act, which builds upon a May 2010 proposal drafted by U.S.
Representatives Rick Boucher and Cliff Stearns, 245 would require any
"covered entity" 2 4 6 that collects such information to provide notice of
collection practices and provide users an opportunity to opt out of
data collection. 247 Disclosure of the protected information to third
parties would require the individual's express consent,248 except in
cases of prior consent, fraud detection, imminent danger, publicly
available information, or compliance with law-such as a statute, sub-
poena, or summons.249
Notably, the Act would not require covered entities to allow users
to opt out when data collection is required for an "operational pur-
pose." 250 This exception would likely allow ISPs and Web site opera-
tors to continue to use and maintain IP address information necessary
to deliver Internet services.251 Consistent with the position taken in
this Comment, the exception implicitly recognizes that IP addresses
are necessary for the operation of Internet services and should only be
protected as personal data when correlated to other identifying
information. 252
Abroad, the European Union Data Protection Working Party found
in 2008 that IP addresses should be protected as "personal data." 253
As the Working Party concluded,
An individual's search history is personal data if the individual to
which it relates, is identifiable. Though IP addresses in most cases
are not directly identifiable by search engines, identification can be
achieved by a third party. Internet access providers hold IP address
245. US Lawmakers Publish Internet Privacy Bill, THE REGISTER (May 6, 2010, 8:13 AM),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/05/06/internet-privacy-bill/.
246. "Covered entity" is defined as "a person engaged in interstate commerce that collects or
stores data containing covered information or sensitive information," except for government
entities and any person who (i) stores information from fewer than 15,000 individuals, (ii) col-
lects information from fewer than 10,000 persons in a twelve-month period, (iii) does not collect
sensitive information, and (iv) does not use the information to study individuals as its primary
business. H.R. 5777 § 2(3).
247. Id. §§ 101-103.
248. Id. § 104(a)(1).
249. Id. § 106.
250. Id. § 103(e).
251. See id. § 2(5)(A) (defining "operational purpose" in part as "a purpose reasonably neces-
sary to facilitate . . . the logistical or technical ability of a covered entity to provide goods or
services").
252. See id. § 2(5)(B) (defining "operational purpose" to exclude information used for a mar-
keting or advertising purpose or any purpose that "would likely affect the individual's conduct or
decisions with respect to the covered entity's products or services").
253. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2008 on Data Protection Issues
Related to Search Engines, 00737/EN/WP148, at 3, 8 (Apr. 4, 2008) [hereinafter WP148]. For a
more detailed analysis of the EU's approach, see Lah, supra note 24, at 695-99.
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data. Law enforcement and national security authorities can gain
access to these data and in some Member States private parties have
gained access also through civil litigation. Thus, in most cases-in-
cluding cases with dynamic IP address allocation-the necessary
data will be available to identify the user(s) of the IP address.254
The Working Party went beyond regulation of ISPs, imposing limita-
tions on Web site operators who use and maintain IP address informa-
tion whenever the addresses are correlated with other personal
information. 255
The High Court of Ireland reached an opinion consistent with the
position proposed in this Comment in its 2010 decision, EMI Records
Limited v. Eircom Limited.2 5 6 EMI and other copyright owners sued
Eircom, an ISP, for the peer-to-peer file sharing of copyrighted mate-
rial conducted on Eircom's network.2 5 7 The parties settled, develop-
ing a protocol by which EMI would inform Eircom of the IP addresses
used to download its copyrighted material, and Eircom would warn,
and possibly disconnect service to, the associated subscribers. 258 In
examining the lawfulness of the settlement terms, the High Court
asked whether IP addresses, in the hands of EMI and its agents, con-
stituted "personal data" under the Data Protection Act. 2 5 9 Unlike the
laws of the United States, the Act provided significant direction by
defining personal data as "[d]ata relating to a living individual who is
or can be identified either from the data or from the data in conjunc-
tion with other information that is in, or is likely to come into, the
possession of the data controller." 2 60
Examining the specifics of the settlement protocol, the High Court
concluded that IP addresses in the hands of EMI or its agents could
not qualify as personal data. 261 The court reasoned that
none of the plaintiffs have any interest in personally identifying any
living person who is infringing their copyright by means of the set-
tlement and protocol. . . . [T]here seems no legal avenue open to
them to get that information apart from an application for the
names and addresses of the copyright thieves to the internet service
provider.262
254. WP148, supra note 253, at 8.
255. Id. at 19-21. See Lah, supra note 24, at 696.
256. EMI Records Ltd. v. Eircom Ltd., [2010] I.E.H.C. 108 (Ire.).
257. Id. 1 1.
258. Id. 2, 9.
259. Id. 1 16.
260. Id. 19. Note that this definition protects both data that actually identify an individual
and data that could identify an individual if correlated to other data in the party's possession.
261. Id. 1 25.
262. Id.
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This conclusion is consistent with the above argument that an IP
address is personally identifiable only when correlated to other per-
sonal data, such as when in the hands of an ISP. During execution of
the settlement protocol, EMI would know only the IP address of a
user suspected of copyright infringement and would have no means by
which to link that information to particular persons. 263 The court cor-
rectly concluded that IP addresses should not be protected as personal
data in such circumstances. The court did not, however, have occasion
to question whether the IP address information should be protected
when in the hands of Eircom itself.
The next Part examines the possible practical results of this move-
ment to classify IP addresses as P11. It examines how IP addresses
could be incorporated into the federal statutory framework,264 how
doing so may affect the current subpoena standards by which a private
litigant may unmask an anonymous online speaker,265 and how online
actors' expectations of privacy in online communications may be
affected. 266
IV. IMPACT
Both the feasibility and the effect of incorporating protections for
IP addresses into current privacy law would depend upon the statu-
tory scheme at issue.267 Some statutes provide a catch-all clause al-
lowing courts to afford protections to unspecified-but nonetheless
private-information. 268 If an IP address falls within these catch-all
clauses because it can identify a particular person, then the release of
such an IP address and the associated subscriber information held by
an ISP would be subject to the particular statute's subpoena
standards.
Other statutes, however, leave no room for new types of PII or do
not set specific standards by which a litigant can subpoena the release
of the information protected. In cases brought under those statutes,
courts must balance the litigants' competing interests in the produc-
tion of the information. When IP address information is at issue,
courts would be better able to balance these interests if they explicitly
263. Id. 1 12.
264. See infra notes 351-68 and accompanying text.
265. See infra notes 369-75 and accompanying text.
266. See infra notes 331-74 and accompanying text.
267. See infra notes 276-87 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8)(F) (2006) (protecting "any other identifier that the Com-
mission determines permits the physical or online contacting of a specific individual").
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recognized the personal nature of the IP address and its ability to link
an individual to his online conduct.
In addition, classifying IP addresses as PII would support reexamin-
ing Fourth Amendment law as applied to basic subscriber informa-
tion.2 69 Current law holds that, under the third party doctrine,
Internet subscribers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in this information because they have voluntarily exposed it to their
ISPs.270 Protecting an IP address as personal information, however,
would support providing stronger protections to the data linking on-
line content to particular subscribers, especially when Internet users
must release this information in order to obtain Internet service. 271
The following Sections briefly examine the myriad of subpoena
standards applicable when unmasking online speakers 272 and the cur-
rent Fourth Amendment law as applied to basic subscriber informa-
tion before imagining how these may change when IP addresses are
considered personal information.
A. Subpoena Standards for Unmasking Online Defendants
The thin veil of anonymity that the Internet provides often requires
that a litigant seeking redress from actions conducted online initially
file his complaint against an unnamed party, the Doe defendant. 273
The plaintiff will then seek a subpoena or court order requiring the
appropriate third party to expose the Doe defendant's true identity.274
The statute providing protection to the personal information at issue
may stipulate the appropriate subpoena standard.275 If the plaintiff
obtains a subpoena pursuant to a statutory provision, the Doe defen-
dant may not have a viable method by which to avoid his
identification. 276
Some statutory standards strongly favor the plaintiff's interest in
identifying a defendant. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA), for example, expressly allows copyright owners to subpoena
269. See infra notes 325-50 and accompanying text.
270. See, e.g., United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that an
Internet user did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the information on
file with his ISP, including his name, e-mail address, telephone number, and physical address).
271. See State v. Reid, 195 A.2d 26, 33 (N.J. 2008).
272. See infra notes 273-322 and accompanying text.
273. See Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 577-78 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
274. Spencer, supra note 29, at 495. See, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 455 (Del. 2005);
Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 944 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
275. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(F) (2006) (requiring a showing of "compelling need"
before a subpoena may issue).
276. See Spencer, supra note 29, at 493.
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ISPs for the identification of alleged infringers. 277 If the plaintiff sub-
mits a subpoena request having the required form and content, the
district court clerk is instructed to "expeditiously issue" the sub-
poena.278 The ISP, upon its receipt of the subpoena, must "expedi-
tiously disclose" the information requested.279  While the
circumstances in which the DMCA authorizes disclosure are lim-
ited,280 exposing a Doe defendant can be fairly automatic and quickly
accomplished under the DMCA standard.
Other statutes provide more protection to the defendant's personal
information. The Video Privacy Protection Act, for example, requires
that a party seeking a court order to expose video rental records make
a showing of "compelling need" and provide the consumer with rea-
sonable notice and an opportunity to contest the disclosure.281 The
plaintiff may obtain an individual's name and address only if that per-
son is given an opportunity to prevent the disclosure.282 Likewise, the
Cable Communications Policy Act requires that an individual be noti-
fied of a court order authorizing the disclosure of his PII to a private
entity.28 3 If the information is to be disclosed to a government entity,
there must be clear and convincing evidence that the individual is sus-
pected of a crime and that the information sought will be material to
the case; the individual must also be given the opportunity to appear
and contest the claim.284
Finally, some statutes provide strong protections to individuals in
only limited circumstances. The Stored Communications Act, for ex-
ample, requires a warrant or court order before a stored electronic
communication or PII is released to a government entity.2 85 A court
order is obtainable only upon specific and articulable facts supporting
a reasonable belief that the information is relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation.286 Because the Act is concerned only
with governmental invasions of privacy, however, it provides no pro-
tection when a private entity seeks the release of customer records:
the statute explicitly authorizes the release of customer records or
277. 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(1) (2006).
278. § 512(h)(4).
279. § 512(h)(5).
280. See Charter Commc'ns, 393 F.3d at 777 (holding that the DMCA does not authorize the
issuing of a subpoena when the ISP merely acts as a "conduit" to infringing conduct).
281. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(F) (2006).
282. § 2710(b)(2)(D).
283. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(B) (2006).
284. § 551(h).
285. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c).
286. § 2703(d).
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other information to "any person other than a governmental
entity." 287
Absent statutory direction, courts must weigh the parties' compet-
ing interests: the plaintiff's interest in seeking redress for alleged
harms and the defendant's interest in remaining anonymous. 288 Set-
ting the subpoena standard too high might leave the plaintiff without
an opportunity to proceed upon even a valid claim, 289 while setting the
standard too low will fail to provide defendants with adequate privacy
protection and might allow their identities to be exposed without ade-
quate notice.290 More importantly, a standard set too low could allow
the plaintiff to use the legal process to unmask an online actor merely
to later seek extra-judicial retribution. 291
Many courts have recently addressed this balancing act in the con-
text of defamation actions.292 The defamation claim is particularly in-
teresting because it already requires balancing the speaker's right in
free speech against the subject's interest in redressing harms to his
reputation.293 In the online world, the relevant factors may tip in the
plaintiff's favor: the Internet allows speakers to reach more people at
a faster rate,294 potentially multiplying the effects of defamatory
speech,295 and the underlying technology provides a method by which
287. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(6); United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 (W.D. Va.
1999) ("[T]he ECPA's concern for privacy extends only to government invasions of privacy.
ISPs are free to turn stored data and transactional records over to nongovernmental entities.").
288. See Doe v. Individuals Whose True Names Are Unknown, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254 (D.
Conn. 2008); Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
289. See Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking "John Doe" Defendants: The Case Against Excessive
Hand-Wringing over Legal Standards, 83 OR. L. REV. 795, 807-08 (2004).
290. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 578; Spencer, supra note 29, at 499.
291. See Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 578 ("People who have committed no wrong should be
able to participate online without fear that someone who wishes to harass or embarrass them can
file a frivolous lawsuit and thereby gain the power of the court's order to discover their iden-
tity."); Spencer, supra note 29, at 498 (discussing a case in which an employer discovered the
identities of twenty-one online speakers, dropped its trade secret suit, and fired the four who
were its employees).
292. See Doe v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 255 (reviewing subpoena standards for un-
masking an anonymous defendant). For further analysis of this line of cases, see generally Maz-
zotta, supra note 32, at 833, and Ryan M. Martin, Freezing the Net: Rejecting a One-Size-Fits-All
Standard for Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers in Defamation Lawsuits, 75 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1217 (2007).
293. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005). When a plaintiff shows sufficient evidence
of a defamation claim, however, further balancing against a defendant's free speech interest is
unnecessary because truly defamatory speech is not protected by the First Amendment. Beau-
harnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941. 956 (D.C. Cir.
2009).
294. See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., No. 40570, 2000 WL 1210372. at *6
(Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. Ct. App. 2001).
295. Id. at *7.
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the speaker may be easily identified.296 Courts have, therefore, grap-
pled with setting a standard that appropriately protects online
speakers.
Three distinct standards have emerged from the case law.297 Pro-
viding the least protection to a speaker's anonymity is the "good
faith" standard articulated by a Virginia trial court in In re Subpoena
Duces Tecum to America Online.2 9 8 In that case, an anonymous pub-
licly traded company sought to expose the identities of five John Doe
defendants who had allegedly made defamatory comments in an
America Online chatroom. 299 Although recognizing the Does' right
to anonymous free speech on the Internet,300 the court found in favor
of the compelling state interest in protecting companies from actiona-
ble communication.301 The court held that it may order an ISP to dis-
close the identity of a subscriber when the plaintiff's pleadings or
evidence show a "legitimate, good faith basis" to claim that it was the
victim of actionable conduct and the identity of the subpoenaed party
is "centrally needed to advance that claim." 302 This standard is fairly
deferential to the plaintiff's interest in seeking redress for alleged
harms.303
At the other end of the spectrum is the "summary judgment" stan-
dard established by the Supreme Court of Delaware in Doe v. Ca-
hill.3 04 A public official sought to expose the identity of an online
poster who allegedly made defamatory remarks on a newspaper blog
lambasting the official's "failed leadership" and "character flaws."305
The trial court adopted the "good faith" standard and held that the
official could subpoena the speaker's ISP for his identifying informa-
tion.306 On Doe's interlocutory appeal, the state supreme court ex-
pressed concern that setting the subpoena standard too low may cause
online actors to self-censor out of fear of future liability.307 A "sue
first, ask questions later" approach and a minimally protective sub-
poena standard could act to "discourage debate on important issues of
296. Martin, supra note 292, at 1220.
297. For further examination of subpoena standards in defamation cases, see id. at 1228-37.
298. Am. Online, 2000 WL 1210372, at *8.
299. Id. at *1.
300. Id. at *6.
301. Id. at *7.
302. Id.
303. See Doe v. Individuals Whose True Names Are Unknown, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 255 (D.
Conn. 2008); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 458 (Del. 2005).
304. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461.
305. Id. at 454.
306. Id. at 455.
307. Id. at 457.
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public concern." 308 Finding the good faith standard too easily met, the
court adopted a stricter "summary judgment" standard.309 Under this
standard, a plaintiff seeking to expose an anonymous defendant must
provide prima facie evidence of his claim and make reasonable efforts
to notify the defendant of a subpoena or application for court or-
der.310 Because the plaintiff would have easy access to proof of most
of the elements of the claim, the court said, it would not be overly
burdensome to require prima facie proof before disclosing the defen-
dant's identity.311
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit re-
cently adopted a standard very near the Cahill summary judgment
standard.312 In Solers, Inc. v. Doe, a Virginia corporation subpoenaed
a trade association for the identifying information of a tipster who had
falsely alleged that the corporation violated copyright law by using
unlicensed software. 313 Unlike other defamation cases, the Doe de-
fendant had not posted his accusation on an Internet message board
but had rather sent a personal message using the trade association's
Web site. 314 Despite this factual difference, and the recognition that a
trial court may need to modify the test "depending on the type of
injury alleged,"315 the court adopted a summary judgment standard. 316
The Solers test required that the plaintiff (1) adequately plead the ele-
ments of his claim and offer evidence creating a genuine issue of ma-
terial fact on every element within his control; (2) use reasonable
efforts to notify the defendant of the subpoena; (3) show that the in-
formation sought would enable the plaintiff to proceed with his law-
suit;3 17 and (4) delay further action to allow the defendant a
reasonable time to move to quash the subpoena. 318
308. Id.
309. Id. at 458, 460. The court relied heavily upon a similar standard imposed by the Superior
Court of New Jersey in the case Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001).
310. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461.
311. Id. at 464. The court noted that it could be difficult or impossible to prove a defendant's
actual malice without discovering the defendant's identity. Id. Therefore, proof of that element
of a public figure's defamation claim could be postponed, and the plaintiff would only be re-
quired to show proof of elements within its control. See id.
312. See Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
313. Id. at 944-45.
314. Id. at 957.
315. Id. at 952.
316. Id. at 954.
317. This factor is easily satisfied when the anonymous speaker the plaintiff seeks to identify is
the defendant, for the plaintiff cannot proceed with his action until he knows who the defendant
is. Id. at 955.
318. See id. at 954.
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Between the stringent "summary judgment" standard and the def-
erential "good faith" standard lies the standard established by the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in Colum-
bia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com. 319 A trademark owner sought to
identify the party who started a Web site using the owner's registered
trademark. 320 The court held that a "motion to dismiss" standard suf-
ficiently balanced the parties' competing interests.321 By requiring the
plaintiff to plead an actionable claim and a likelihood that the discov-
ery would reveal the identity of the Doe defendant, the standard
would help "to prevent abuse of this extraordinary application of the
discovery process." 322
While these subpoena standards are quite varied, there are certain
elements consistent within each. 32 3 Before unmasking a Doe defen-
dant, most courts require a plaintiff to provide adequate notice to the
defendant, to make some evidentiary showing of the merits of his
claim, and to explain why the need to expose the online actor's iden-
tity outweighs that person's First Amendment right to anonymous
speech.324
B. The Fourth Amendment Provides No Protection to
Transactional Information
Although an in-depth discussion of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence as applied to the Internet is outside the scope of this Com-
ment,325 one critical concern must be mentioned in light of the many
criminal cases discussed above. A criminal defendant may be tempted
to argue that he has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy
in the subscriber information on file with his ISP.326 The defendant
may reason that he disclosed his name, address, browsing history, and
other personal information to his ISP only for the limited purpose of
319. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
320. Id. at 575-76.
321. See id. at 579. The court's full test contained four prongs, requiring the plaintiff to (1)
"identify the missing party with sufficient specificity such that the Court can determine that
defendant is a real person," (2) "identify all previous steps taken to locate the elusive defen-
dant," (3) establish that the case could withstand a motion to dismiss, and (4) file a discovery
request with the court identifying the persons on whom discovery could be served. Id. at 578-80.
322. See id. at 579-80. The motion to dismiss standard has been criticized as potentially con-
fusing because of variations in standards across jurisdictions. Doe v. Individuals Whose True
Names Are Unknown, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 255 (D. Conn. 2008).
323. See Mazzotta, supra note 32, at 846.
324. Id. at 847-56.
325. For more on Fourth Amendment protections online, see generally Solove, supra note 9,
at 1083, and Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach,
62 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2010).
326. See, e.g., United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010).
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obtaining Internet services and did not consent to the release of that
information to third parties. 327
This argument, however, would probably be unavailing. "Every
federal court to address this issue has held that subscriber information
provided to an internet provider is not protected by the Fourth
Amendment's privacy expectation." 328  Under the third party doc-
trine, all objectively reasonable expectations of privacy are extin-
guished when users voluntarily expose data to third parties.329
Because Internet users "voluntarily convey[ ] all this information to
[their] internet and phone companies . .. [they] assume[ ] the risk that
those companies [will] reveal the information to the police."330
This result is generally in accordance with similar case law gov-
erning the disclosure of information voluntarily exposed to telephone
operators and similar entities.331 The apparent unwillingness to distin-
guish between older technology and the Internet is understandable. 332
As the Supreme Court recently noted in a case examining whether a
government employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
text messages sent from his employer-issued pager, "The judiciary
risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment impli-
cations of emerging technology before its role in society has become
clear."333
Nevertheless, it may be time to reexamine Fourth Amendment law,
particularly the third party doctrine, as applied to the Internet. 334 In
his famous dissent to the 1928 wire-tapping case Olmstead v. United
States,335 Justice Louis Brandeis expressed concern that "[w]ays may
some day be developed by which the Government, without removing
327. See id.
328. Id. (quoting United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008)); see also Kerr,
supra note 325, at 1026 ("Courts ... have uniformly concluded that the Fourth Amendment does
not protect [basic subscriber information].").
329. See David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Prin-
ciples to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205, 2227
(2009).
330. Bynum, 604 F.3d at 164 (alterations omitted) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979)); see, e.g., Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir.
2001) (concluding that "computer users do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their
subscriber information because they have conveyed it to another person-the system operator").
331. See Couillard, supra note 329, at 2214-15, 2227; Robert A. Pikowsky, An Overview of the
Law of Electronic Surveillance Post September 11, 2001, 94 L. LIBR. J. 601, 608 (2002).
332. The lethargic way in which courts have approached Fourth Amendment concerns online
is certainly not unprecedented: "[I]t took the Supreme Court until 1967-nearly a full century
after the invention of the telephone-to recognize telephone conversations as constitutionally
protected against unreasonable searches." Couillard, supra note 329, at 2206.
333. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010).
334. See Kerr, supra note 325, at 1006-07.
335. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by
which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occur-
rences of the home." 336 Today, with the help of ISPs, the government
has easy access to these "papers." IP addresses allow the "govern-
ment [to] learn the names of stores at which a person shops, the politi-
cal organizations a person finds interesting, a person's sexual fetishes
and fantasies, her health concerns, and so on,"3 37 but Internet users
currently have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the subscriber
data linking this information back to them as individuals. To say that
Internet subscribers voluntarily exposed this information to ISPs is
simplistic and misleading. After all, the only way to avoid releasing
this information to an ISP is to not use the Internet at all. 338
Interestingly, New Jersey constitutional law may provide a model
for updating the third party doctrine. In the 2008 case State v. Reid,339
the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the state's constitution
affords its citizens a reasonable expectation of privacy in the sub-
scriber information provided to ISPs.340 The defendant Shirley Reid
was indicted for second-degree computer theft after she allegedly
logged onto a Web site belonging to one of her employer's suppliers,
changed her employer's password to the site, and altered the em-
ployer's shipping address.341 The supplier subsequently informed
Reid's employer of the changes and provided it with the IP address
that the perpetrator had used to log onto the Web site.34 2 The em-
ployer issued a municipal subpoena to the associated ISP and received
Reid's name, home address, telephone number, account number, e-
mail address, and method of payment in return.343
The trial court granted Reid's motion to suppress the subpoena evi-
dence and the appellate court affirmed, finding various procedural
flaws in the subpoena and concluding that Reid had a protected pri-
vacy interest in her subscriber information. 3" On appeal, the state
supreme court began by recognizing that the New Jersey constitution
affords greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
336. Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
337. Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1264, 1287 (2004).
338. "To sign up for [Internet] service, a customer must disclose personal information includ-
ing one's name, billing information, phone number, and home address." State v. Reid, 945 A.2d
26, 28 (N.J. 2008) (emphasis added).
339. Id. at 26.
340. Id. at 28.
341. Id. at 27.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 27, 29-30.
344. Id. at 30.
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than that provided by the Fourth Amendment. 345 The court reviewed
State v. Hunt,3 4 6 a 1982 case in which the court had extended privacy
protection to telephone records by reasoning that such information
was released only as a necessity for obtaining phone service.3 47 Anal-
ogizing ISP records to those maintained by phone companies and
banks, the Reid court reasoned that Internet users should not lose
their privacy interest in information that they must release in order to
obtain Internet service. 348
In the world of the Internet, the nature of the technology requires
individuals to obtain an IP address to access the Web. Users make
disclosures to ISPs for the limited goal of using that technology and
not to promote the release of personal information to others.
Under our precedents, users are entitled to expect confidentiality
under these circumstances. 349
While adopting a viewpoint closer to that expressed in Reid would
require significant retooling of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
such changes may be necessary. As Orin Kerr, professor at George
Washington University Law School, recently concluded, "[T]he appli-
cation of the Fourth Amendment to computer networks will require
considerable rethinking of preexisting law . . . ."350
C. Recognizing IP Addresses as PII Will Help Protect
Online Identity
Unsurprisingly, the burden of incorporating IP addresses into the
wide and varied framework of privacy law would itself be widely dif-
ferent depending upon the context. Some statutes anticipate the addi-
tion of categories of data to the list of PII. COPPA, for example, lists
under its definition of personal information "any other identifier that
the Commission determines permits the physical or online contacting
of a specific individual." 351 The False Identification Crime Control
Act includes a "unique electronic identification number, address, or
routing code" as a means of identification. 3 5 2 For these and similar
statutes, no change need be made other than an explicit recognition
that an IP address may be personally identifiable and otherwise meets
the criteria of data worth protecting.
345. Id. at 32.
346. State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982).
347. Reid, 945 A.2d at 32.
348. Id. at 33.
349. Id.
350. Kerr, supra note 325, at 1006-07.
351. 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8)(F) (2006).
352. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7)(C) (2006).
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Other statutes would require substantial amendment. The Stored
Communications Act, for example, allows "basic subscriber informa-
tion,"353 including "any temporarily assigned network address," to be
obtained with a mere subpoena. 354 To protect the user's online iden-
tity as exposed by an IP address, this category of easily accessible in-
formation could be removed. Such an amendment could be in
accordance with the Act's purpose: to protect the content of stored e-
mail.355 Limiting access to a user's IP address would likewise prevent
the easy correlation of an individual to the content of his online
activity. 356
Once protected by statute, the IP address would be subject to the
applicable subpoena standards. As discussed above, these standards
would provide varying degrees of protection to the online speaker's
identity.3 57 This may be a desirable result. The statutes were enacted
for particular purposes358 and already strike a balance between the
plaintiff's and defendant's interests. The DMCA, for example, allows
subpoenas to "expeditiously issue" in order to protect the rights of
copyright owners.359 The standard weighs in favor of the plaintiff cop-
yright owner who desires to quickly stop the distribution of his intel-
lectual property. The Video Privacy Protection Act, on the other
hand, requires a higher showing of compelling need and ample notifi-
cation to the subject.360 This balance suggests that the release of video
rental records is less important to the plaintiff, less time-sensitive, and
more private.
Specifically recognizing IP addresses as PII should not alter these
balances. Providing due respect for the power of an IP address to
identify an individual would, however, provide a better guide for
courts' analyses and could alter the outcome of close cases. The 2008
case Viacom v. YouTube 361 presents a pertinent example. Viacom
and other copyright owners sued YouTube on direct, vicarious, and
contributory infringement theories for allowing users to upload and
353. Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide
to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1219-20 (2004).
354. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2).
355. See Kerr, supra note 353, at 1234.
356. See EFF Amicus Brief, supra note 120, at 4 (noting that the IP information at issue in the
Klimas case "include[d] information about what subscribers communicated, viewed or read on-
line").
357. See supra notes 273-87 and accompanying text.
358. Lah, supra note 24, at 684; Berman & Mulligan, supra note 10, at 576.
359. 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(4) (2006).
360. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(F) (2006).
361. Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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view their copyrighted videos on the YouTube Web site. 3 6 2 During
discovery, Viacom sought YouTube's logging database, which linked
User IDs and IP addresses to the videos that each user had viewed or
uploaded.363 YouTube sought the protection of the Video Privacy
Protection Act, arguing that releasing the data would allow Viacom to
determine the viewing and uploading habits of individual users.364
The district court refused to apply the Act, reasoning that YouTube's
privacy concerns were speculative because the IDs and IP addresses
could not in themselves identify individuals. 365 The court subse-
quently granted production of the database. 366
Given the ability of IP addresses to identify users, YouTube's argu-
ment should have been given greater weight. Armed with YouTube's
database, Viacom could, for example, choose the top one hundred IP
addresses used to upload its copyrighted material. Viacom could ob-
tain the names, addresses, and other personal information of the users
tied to those IP addresses by issuing subpoenas to the appropriate
ISPs. The company could then sue those users directly for copyright
infringement in the same way that the RIAA has sued individual file-
sharers.3 67 While YouTube activity should probably not be hidden
behind the Video Privacy Protection Act, which exists to protect the
records of legitimate video rentals, the court's analysis would have
been better served by recognizing that the logging database would al-
low Viacom to identify particular YouTube users and their viewing
habits. Giving Viacom access to such a database is not a trivial matter,
and it deserved the court's considered analysis of whether Viacom's
interest in tracking down copyright infringers outweighed the privacy
interests of potentially millions of users who would be linked to the
content they had viewed on the Web site. 368
Recognizing the ability of an IP address to identify an individual
will also be important for a court's analysis when it must balance the
parties' competing interests absent a statutory subpoena standard. In
some circumstances, more may be at stake than merely identifying the
defendant: whenever a plaintiff compels the production of logs that
362. Id. at 258-59.
363. Id. at 261.
364. Id. at 262.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. See supra notes 187-93 and accompanying text (discussing a case in which the RIAA
sought to use IP addresses to expose the identities of alleged downloaders of copyrighted music).
368. See Patricia Sdnchez Abril & Anita Cava, Health Privacy in a Techno-Social World: A
Cyber-Patient's Bill of Rights, 6 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 244, 251 (2008) (expressing con-
cern that the decision could set precedent requiring social networking Web sites to disclose their
users' computer locations and online activities).
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identify IP traffic, users may be associated with the content of their
online activity. 369
Adequately protecting the online actor's interest requires that one
of the more stringent subpoena standards be applied. 370 The Solers
test, which requires the plaintiff to meet the summary judgment stan-
dard and use reasonable efforts to provide notice to the defendant,371
would ensure that the plaintiff's interest in exposing the defendant
outweighs the defendant's interest in remaining anonymous. By re-
quiring a plaintiff to make a significant showing of his case, a court
would deter the misuse of the discovery process to expose online ac-
tors merely for extra-judicial retribution or speech suppression. 372
Providing the defendant notice of the subpoena and sufficient time to
submit a motion to quash would ensure that a defendant with impor-
tant privacy concerns is afforded an opportunity to protect his
interests. 373
Finally, recognizing the reality of what an IP address can do would
support reexamining the application of Fourth Amendment law to
these situations. Cases that hold users have no Fourth Amendment
interest in the information voluntarily exposed to ISPs have viewed IP
addresses as transactional data, similar to a listing of the telephone
numbers a particular user dialed. 374 As this Comment has discussed,
however, IP addresses are more likely to disclose the content of a
user's online activity. Although redialing a phone number may not
reveal the content of the user's previous conversation,375 browsing for
the particular IP address may reveal that the user visited a socially
unpopular Web site or even one that contained criminalized material.
This possibility means that, in some circumstances, IP addresses are
more akin to the content of communications than they are transac-
tional data and should be protected appropriately.
Whatever the context, courts should recognize the value and impor-
tance of IP addresses to online conduct and the litigation that arises
369. See Couillard, supra note 329, at 2229 (discussing how the transactional nature of IP
addresses may be conflated with the content of Internet communications).
370. See supra notes 304-18 and accompanying text.
371. Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 955 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
372. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 462 (Del. 2005) (adopting a summary judgment standard
as the proper balance between the parties' interests).
373. Accord id.
374. See Couillard, supra note 329, at 2215; cf Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979)
("[W]e doubt that people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the [tele-
phone] numbers they dial.").
375. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743 (distinguishing between the telephone number dialed, to which
the user had no reasonable expectation of privacy, and the contents of the communication);
Couillard, supra note 329, at 2229.
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out of that activity. An IP address may be no more than a number,
but it may be associated with a particular individual in the same man-
ner as a home address or telephone number, pieces of data that are
consistently protected as personal. In fact, IP addresses go further by
linking users to their online activities. As the technology progresses,
the likelihood of identifying a user will increase: with the new IPv6
protocol, most devices connected to the Internet will have a unique,
static address that can distinguish that device anywhere in the
world.37 6 The technical hurdles will be removed, and all online activ-
ity will be linked to particular laptops, computers, cell phones, PDAs,
and their users.377
Recognizing an IP address as personal data should not create a
blanket of anonymity online. Crimes and civil wrongs are committed
online every day, and those harmed by these actions deserve the ap-
propriate remedies. Nevertheless, courts need to be able to factor on-
line privacy concerns into their balancing of litigants' interests. The
first step in improving that balancing analysis is recognizing that IP
addresses can often be traced back to online actors and should, there-
fore, be considered personally identifiable information.
V. CONCLUSION
In mid-2003, the RIAA obtained seventy-five subpoenas every day,
each using an IP address to unmask the identity of an alleged
downloader of illegal music files.378 Many such subpoenas are issued
as a matter of course,379 and while some courts have expressed con-
cern for the anonymous online speaker, others have uniformly
granted subpoenas without judicial oversight.380 Often, the speaker's
privacy concerns are never addressed.381
When courts do examine privacy interests, however, they often
struggle to find the proper balance between a defendant's right to re-
main anonymous and a plaintiff's right to due process of law.382 This
struggle demonstrates the importance of IP addresses: armed with an
IP address, a cooperating ISP, and an IP address log, any litigant can
determine the identity of an online speaker. Like a Social Security
number, home address, or telephone number, an IP address is often
376. See Weinberg, supra note 66, at 1260-61.
377. See id.
378. Vogel, supra note 289, at 814.
379. Tene, supra note 18, at 1455.
380. See Vogel, supra note 289, at 803; Ham, supra note 68, at 20.
381. See Mazzotta, supra note 32, at 855.
382. See supra notes 288-322 and accompanying text.
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correlated to the identifying information of a particular individual.
Although the personal information on file with an ISP may not always
be the actual speaker's name, identifying the Internet subscriber will
usually be enough to narrow the search to a small number of individu-
als, such as members of a particular household. 383
Despite some technical shortcomings, the IP address is more often
than not able to expose the person behind the computer. As the tech-
nology progresses, IP addresses will be even more consistently tied to
individual devices and their users. If courts are willing to permit this
correlation to provide probable cause to suspect an individual of on-
line activity, or to serve as circumstantial evidence tending to prove a
defendant's liability for online conduct, they should also be willing to
consider the privacy interests involved. Protecting IP addresses as
personally identifiable information will assist courts in properly con-
sidering these interests and in balancing the litigants' expectations of
online privacy.
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